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Abstract
Internet has its own inherent security issues in terms of confidentiality, integrity and privacy. The main impact of 
these kinds of issues is specifically on the banking industry as they have increased their Internet banking 
facilities in order to reduce costs and provide better services and banking convenience to their Internet banking 
customers. However, banking customers have not had a choice of Internet banking mainly due to the fact that 
they are already tied to whatever form of Internet banking that their current bank provides. This paper therefore 
examined Internet banking security systems in Australian banks by creating the proposed Internet banking 
security checklist which can benefit both existing and potential Internet banking customers to use as an Internet 
banking security guideline. Furthermore, the results uncovered were lack of Internet banking security in all the 
16 selected Australian banks. These can impact its existing and potential customers’ confidentiality in terms of 
using Internet banking. Better Internet banking security information, two-factor authentication and stronger 
encryption in use are some of the example recommendations. In addition, this study can be extended to cover 
more in-depth details which cover interviewing and auditing from a customer perspective, the design and format 
of the Internet banking website and mobile banking security. 
Keywords 
Australia, comparative analysis, customer perspective, Internet banking security 
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of Internet technologies, the Internet has become a significant element in almost every business 
(Gunasekaran & Love, 1999; Karim et al., 2009). One of the most significant developments in this aspect is the 
banking industry (Hamid et al., 2007). The Internet has the capability to integrate and transform a traditional 
business to a model of electronic commerce (e-commerce) in providing banking alternatives and facilitating for 
the convenience to their Internet banking customers (Steinfield, 2002). In fact, most of the banks around the 
world have adjusted their business strategy to attain competitive benefits, reduce operational costs and enhance 
their performance by offering an Internet banking system to their Internet banking customers (Hutchison & 
Warren, 2003; the National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE) et al., 1999). Hence, the Internet 
banking customers have the option of accessing their bank accounts and making transactions anytime and 
anywhere (Gurau, 2002; Karim et al., 2009). However, the Internet banking systems have associated 
information security threats and risks which can be assessed as low, medium and high (Usonlinebiz, 2008). 
Privacy and security of Internet banking transactions and confidentiality of personal information are among the 
biggest concerns for both the banking industry and the Internet banking customers (Hutchison & Warren, 2001, 
2003)  
Adware, keylogger, malware, phishing, spyware, Trojans and viruses are the most common Internet banking 
security threats and risks (BankMuscat, 2009; Ekberg et al., 2007; RSA, 2010). Furthermore, there are some 
additional Internet banking security threats and risks that impact both the banks and the Internet banking 
customers. These include security awareness of the Internet banking customers and the banks, Internet banking 
customers’ online behaviour, threats (both authentication and authorisation), exposure to new potential threats, 
Internet banking customers’ trust of the Internet banking system, the mobile banking security problem, 
protection against man-in-the-middle attack and man-in-the-browser attack, identity and/or information theft 
sourced from social networking sites, healthcare and government portals using only a single-factor 
authentication (RSA, 2010). These factors have the potential to influence traditional baking customers from 
switching to the Internet banking.  (Ekberg et al., 2007; Georg et al., 2009; RSA, 2010). 
Therefore, the main purpose of this paper was to investigate the security of Internet banking systems of 
Australian banks by deploying a comparative analysis approach in generating a proposed Internet banking 
security checklist. This checklist could then be potentially used to evaluate their Internet banking security 
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systems based on the Internet banking information which is currently provided on the selected Australian banks’ 
websites. As a result, the potential Internet banking customers can be provided with a security background and a 
notion of Internet banking security prior to choosing a bank to commence the Internet banking with. On the 
other hand, the existing customers can use this checklist to identify their own security weaknesses and better 
secure their Internet banking experience. 
The rest of this paper is organised into four main sections: methodology, analysis and conclusions, 
recommendations and future works. 
METHODOLOGY
This paper applied a qualitative research method by deploying a comparative analysis approach. This 
comparative analysis was conducted by examining the availability of Internet banking security features of the 
Australian banks. 
Sample  
In order to fulfil the purpose of this paper, 16 Australian banks including major, competitor and sub banks were 
selected as they were able to provide a good setting for the comparative analysis for the proposed Internet 
banking security checklist. Nevertheless, Bendigo Bank and Adelaide Bank Limited were separately analysed as 
they were using different security features on their Internet banking security systems prior to and after merging. 
The list of Australian banks used in the analysis is displayed below. 
 
Table 1 List of Australian banks used in the analysis 
 
Count Banks Headquarters 
1 Adelaide Bank Limited Bendigo 
2 AMP Bank Limited Sydney 
3 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ) Melbourne 
4 Bank of Queensland Limited Brisbane 
5 Bank of South Australia (BankSA) (a division of the Westpac 
Banking Corporation) 
Adelaide 
6 Bank of Western Australia Limited (a subsidiary of CBA, trading as 
BankWest) 
Perth 
7 Bendigo Bank Bendigo 
8 Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) Sydney 
9 Rural Bank Limited (a wholly owned subsidiary of Bendigo and 
Adelaide Bank Limited) 
Adelaide 
10 Macquarie Bank Limited Sydney 
11 Members Equity Bank Pty Limited Melbourne 
12 National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) Melbourne 
13 St.George Bank Limited (a division of the Westpac Banking 
Corporation) 
Sydney 
14 Suncorp-Metway Limited Brisbane 
15 UBank (a division of NAB) Melbourne 
16 Westpac Banking Corporation Sydney 
 
(Sources: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), 2011, p. 1; the Australian Bankers Association 
(ABA), 2010, pp. 1-3) 
Data collection 
This paper utilised a secondary data source which was freely-and readily-available through the selected banks’ 
websites in order to assess their Internet banking security features.  
Furthermore, we created the proposed Internet banking security checklist for the purposes of evaluating the 
security features of the selected banks. The results and findings from the proposed Internet banking security 
checklist can provide external validity for other related sectors or organisations to best used as a guideline for 
improving their own performances on Internet banking security systems. The checklist is presented and 
explained in detail in the following sections. 
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The proposed Internet banking security checklist 
There are six main security feature categories that banks provide and offer their Internet banking customers. 
These include  (1) general online security and privacy information to the Internet banking customers; (2) 
Information technology (IT) assistance, monitoring and support; (3) software and system requirements and 
settings information; (4) bank site authentication technology; (5) user site authentication technology; and (6) 
Internet banking application security features. Details on each of these security feature category are explained 
below.   
Section 1: General online security and privacy information to the Internet banking customers 
This section covers general online security and privacy information as follows: 
 Account aggregation or privacy and confidentiality; 
 Losses compensation guarantee; 
 Online/Internet security information; and  
 Bank security mechanism system. 
Account aggregation or privacy and confidentiality: This subsection investigates the current privacy and 
confidentiality policy which the banks provide to the Internet banking customers. The policy must comply with 
privacy laws and incorporate the National Privacy Principles in order to ensure the integrity of the Internet 
banking customers’ confidential information. In terms of use and disclosure, the banks must also comply with 
any legal or regulatory obligations in their stipulation. 
Losses compensation guarantee: This subsection examines with the banks current guarantee policy where the 
banks are obliged to cover any losses in case unauthorised transactions by someone other than the customer 
using customers’ Internet banking accounts.  
Online/Internet banking security information: This subsection inspects the Internet security information which 
is provided by the banks to their Internet banking customers. These cover important and related Internet banking 
security information such as threats, security guidelines and tips. 
Bank security mechanism system: This subsection attempts to identify whether the banks provide information 
on their Internet banking security systems such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS) which have 
the capability to enhance privacy and confidentiality of the Internet banking customers. 
Section 2: IT assistance, monitoring and support 
This section consists of hotline and helpdesk service availability as well as Internet banking transaction 
monitoring by the banks. 
Hotline/helpdesk service availability: This subsection checks the banks’ websites in order to identify 
information related to an IT hotline or helpdesk support for the Internet banking customers. Ideally, the banks 
should provide several different modes of communication with the Internet banking customers. Telephony and 
secure email are some of the common communication methods. 
Internet banking transaction monitoring by the banks: This subsection attempts to determine whether the 
banks provide their own dedicated teams for monitoring possible suspicion transactions on their Internet 
banking systems. 
Section 3: Software and system requirements and settings information 
This section is comprised of three parts as follows: 
 Compatibility “best” with the popular Internet browsers; 
 Internet banking user device system and browser setting requirement; and 
 Free/paid security software/tool available to the Internet banking customers. 
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Compatibility “best” with the popular Internet browsers: This subsection identifies whether the banks’ Internet 
banking systems are able to support or are compatible with the world’s most popular Internet browsers such as 
Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Apply Safari based on the information 
provided by the banks. 
Internet banking user device system and browser setting requirement: This subsection looks at operating 
systems, browser settings and screen resolution requirements information which are provided by the banks for 
optimum usage. 
Free/paid security software/tool available to the Internet banking customers: This subsection is concerned 
with determining whether the banks have provided an optional Internet security software or tool for their 
customers in order to minimise any potential risks to the Internet banking customers’ personal computers. 
Section 4: Bank site authentication technology  
This section involves an identification of the bank authentication technology which is currently employed to 
cover types of secure sockets layer (SSL) encryption, digital certificate technology and certificate authority 
(CA). SSL encryption generates an encrypted link between the banks’ web servers and the Internet banking 
customers’ Internet browsers in order to provide private and secure communications between both the parties 
(Comodo, n.d.). 
Section 5: User site authentication technology 
This section is concerned with identifying authentication technology that the Internet banking customers interact 
with to authenticate with the banks. This user site authentication technology section consists of the followings: 
  Two-factor authentication for logon and/or for transaction verification available; 
  Logon requirements; 
  Logon failure limitation; 
  Logon user input type; 
  Scramble an on-screen input keypad; 
  Password restriction/requirement; and 
  Transaction verification. 
Two-factor authentication for logon and/or for transaction verification available: Two-factor authentication 
can be considered as a strong authentication mechanism (RSA, n.d.). Typically, two-factor authentication 
requires a combination of two identifiers for the verification of a transaction or an identity (VeriSign 
Authentication Services, n.d.-a). These two identifiers are physical and remembered identifiers (Bank of 
Queensland Limited, n.d.). The physical identifier can be a short message service (SMS) mobile number or a pin 
number or a generated security token. This subsection identifies whether there are any two-factor authentication 
mechanisms in use for logon as well as for transaction verification at the selected banks. 
Logon requirements: This subsection identifies the Internet banking logon requirements of the banks. In 
general, Internet banking logon requirements may include two to three identifiers. The first identifier may be a 
bank/credit card number or a bank register/customer ID or an email address of the Internet banking customers. 
This first identifier information is known by both the banks and the Internet banking customers. On the other 
hand, the second identifier may be a remembered type identifier such as a password which is only created by the 
Internet banking customers. Some banks may include its logon requirements by incorporating with another 
remembered identifier such as a personal access code or a security number. This can enhance user site 
authentication security. Finally, the third identifier may be two-factor authentication mechanism as mentioned 
earlier. 
Logon failure limitation: This subsection verifies a number of consecutive unsuccessful login attempts which is 
allowed by the banks before disabling or locking out the Internet banking customers’ Internet banking accounts 
in order to protect against unauthorised access (Suncorp-Metway Limited, n.d.). This verification detail is based 
on information provided on the banks’ websites. 
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Logon user input type: This subsection identifies a logon user input type of the banks’ Internet banking 
systems. Typically, the logon user input type may require input information from a keyboard. Furthermore, 
other input type such as a keypad can be incorporated with a logon authentication system. 
Scramble an on-screen input keypad: This subsection involves checking on a logon user input keypad to 
determine whether the keypad has a scramble feature which changes the keypad at every logon. This can protect 
the Internet banking customers against any potential keylogger attacks which record the customer’s keystroke 
information (e.g. login ID and password) without their knowledge. 
Password restriction/requirement: This subsection investigates the password restrictions and requirements on 
Internet banking accounts. For example, the password length, combination of numbers and letters, case 
sensitivity, use of special characters, different passwords to any previously used passwords and automatically 
checking of password strength when creating or changing passwords. 
Transaction verification: This subsection determines whether the Internet banking customers may require any 
type of verification during the Internet banking transaction period particularly when dealing with external 
transactions. Examples of such verification methods may be SMSs, tokens or passwords. 
Section 6: Internet banking application security features 
This section audits the following categories of security features of the banks’ Internet banking applications: 
 Automatic timeout feature for inactivity; 
 Limited default daily transfer amount to third party account/BPAY/international transactions; 
 Logging information; and 
 Session management. 
Automatic timeout feature for inactivity: This subsection identifies a default automatic timeout setting limit 
which can automatically log the Internet banking customers off, as well as end the Internet banking session in 
case of no activity occurring on the Internet banking session for a preset period of time. 
Limited default daily transfer amount to third party account/BPAY/international transactions: This 
subsection intends to find out a default daily transfer amount limitation when the Internet banking customers 
transfer money locally and globally. 
Logging information: This subsection aims to discover whether the Internet banking system logging 
information is available to the Internet banking customers based on the information provided on the banks’ 
websites. Typically, the logging information can include last login information attempted such as the date and 
time. In addition, activity logging information may be included. The Internet banking customers can utilise this 
information to ensure that their logon activities are normal and expected. 
Session management: This subsection investigates the Internet banking session management which includes 
session tokens, page tokens technologies which are currently deployed at the selected banks based on the 
information which is provided on their websites. Furthermore, clearing information on Internet browser’s 
cookies after the Internet banking customers logoff or shut down the Internet browser is also investigated. 
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ANALYSIS  
The analysis and results finding are summarised in Table 2 and the following discussions. 
Table 2 A summary of the proposed Internet banking security checklist 
Australian banks 
 
Security feature 
categories  
Major 4 banks Competitor banks Sub banks 
A
N
Z
  
C
B
A
N
A
B
  
W
estpac  
A
delaide 
A
M
P 
Q
ueensland 
BankW
est 
Bendigo
R
ural  
M
acquarie  
M
em
bers E
quity  
Suncorp-M
etw
ay 
BankSA
 
St. G
eorge 
U
Bank 
1. General online security and privacy information to the Internet banking customers 
1.1 Account aggregation or privacy and confidentiality 
1.1.1 Complied with 
the national 
privacy 
principles and 
privacy law 
                
1.2 Losses compensation guarantee 
1.2.1 100%       NI  NI NI NI NI     
1.3 Online/Internet banking security information 
1.3.1 Threats: Hoax 
email, scam, 
phishing, 
spyware, virus 
and Trojan 
                
1.3.2 Keylogger                 
1.3.3 General online 
security 
guidelines 
                
1.3.4 Security alert/up-
to-date issue 
                
1.3.5 Provides 
password 
security tips 
                
1.4 Bank security mechanism system 
1.4.1 Antivirus 
protection 
               
1.4.2 Firewall(s)                 
1.4.3 IDS/alert system                 
1.4.4 Other                 
1.4.5 No information                 
2. IT assistance, monitoring and support 
2.1 Hotline/helpdesk service availability 
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2.1.1 24/7 customer 
contact centre by 
phone  
                
2.1.2 Not 24/7 
customer contact 
centre by phone  
                
2.1.3 Secured email           NI      
2.1.4 FAQ/online 
support form 
                
2.2 Internet banking transaction monitoring by the banks 
2.2.1 Provides 
dedicated team 
and technology 
for monitoring 
all transactions 
    NI      NI NI     
3. Software and system requirements and settings information 
3.1 Compatibility “best” with the popular Internet browsers (based on the bank’s information provided)
3.1.1 Chrome                 
3.1.2 Firefox                 
3.1.3 Internet Explorer                 
3.1.4 Netscape                 
3.1.5 Opera                 
3.1.6 Safari                 
3.1.7 No information                 
3.2 Internet banking user device system and browser setting requirement 
3.2.1 Operating 
system 
                
3.2.2 Type of browser                 
3.2.3 Browser setting                 
3.2.4 Screen resolution                 
3.2.5 No information                 
3.3 Free/paid security software/tool available to the Internet banking customers 
3.3.1 Antivirus/anti-
spyware 
                
3.3.2 Internet security 
suite 
                
3.3.3 Provides Internet 
links to security 
software 
vendor(s) 
                
3.3.4 No information                 
4. Bank site authentication technology 
4.1 Employed encryption and digital certificate technologies 
4.1.1 SSL encryption A A A A D R D R A A R R R R R R
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4.1.2 Extended 
validation SSL 
certificates 
                
4.1.3 Signing CA V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V 
5. User site authentication technology 
5.1 Two-factor authentication for logon and/or for transaction verification available 
5.1.1 Token device    *   *  * *  *    
5.1.2 SMS                  
5.1.3 Not in use                 
5.2 Logon requirement 
5.2.1 Bank/credit 
cards number or 
bank 
register/customer 
ID or email 
address 
                
5.2.2 Password                 
5.2.3 Other e.g. 
personal code or 
security number 
      *          
5.2.4 Two-factor 
authentication 
        * *   *    
5.3 Logon failure limitation 
5.3.1 Max. (times) 3  3  3  3  3   3 3   3 
5.3.2 In use but does 
not specific 
maximum 
number of failure 
allowed 
                
5.3.3 No information                 
5.4 Logon user input type 
5.4.1 Keyboard                 
5.4.2 Keypad                 
5.5 Scramble an on-screen input keypad 
5.5.1 Customer ID N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
5.5.2 Password N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
  N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
 N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
N
A 
5.6 Password restriction/requirement 
5.6.1 Enforce good 
password 
practice 
    N
A 
     NI N
A 
    
5.6.2 Password length 
(characters) 
8-
16 
8-
16 
6-
8 
6 NI 6-
15 
8-
20 
6-
10 
8 8 NI NI 6-
8 
6-
12 
6-
12 
NI 
5.6.3 Combination of     N      NI N *    
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numbers and 
letters 
A A 
5.6.4 Combination of 
upper and lower 
cases 
*    N
A 
  *   NI N
A 
* * * * 
5.6.5 Special 
characters 
 *   N
A 
 *    NI N
A 
    
5.6.6 Different 
passwords as 
compared to any 
of previous used 
passwords 
NI 5 NI 1 NI 8  NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI 
5.6.7 Automatically 
check password 
strength when 
creating or 
changing 
password 
NI  NI NI NI   NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI 
5.7 Transaction verification 
5.7.1 All transactions 
required 
token/SMS 
                
5.7.2 Some external 
transactions 
required 
token/SMS 
      *          
5.7.3 Other method 
e.g. password 
                
5.7.4 No information                
6. Internet banking application security features 
6.1 Automatic timeout feature for inactivity 
6.1.1 Max. (mins) 15 15     10 15 10    10   20 
6.1.2 In use but does 
not specify 
timeout length 
                
6.1.3 No information                 
6.2 Limited default daily transfer amount to third party account/BPAY/international transactions 
6.2.1 Less or up to 
$5,000 AUD 
                
6.2.2 More than 
$5,000 AUD 
                
6.2.3 The default 
maximum daily 
limit transfer is 
vary depend on 
the type of the 
Internet banking 
customer 
                
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6.2.4 The maximum 
daily limit 
transfer may be 
increased with 
the approval by 
the banks 
                
6.2.5 No information                  
6.3 Logging information 
6.3.1 Last login                 
6.3.2 Activity log                 
6.3.3 No information                 
6.4 Session management 
6.4.1 Session tokens                 
6.4.2 Page tokens                 
6.4.3 Clear session 
cookie 
information after 
logoff or shut 
down the 
Internet browser 
                
6.4.4 No information                 
 
  represents yes *  represents  optional 
NA represents  not applicable NI represents no information 
A  represents  AES 256-bit encryption R  represents  RC4 128-bit encryption 
D  represents  3DES-EDE-CBC 168-bit encryption V represents  VeriSign Authentication Services 
Note: 
Blue A is a wrong or not up-to-date information provided SSL encryption as 128-bit instead of 256-bit on the 
banks’ websites.
Difficulty of finding some Internet banking security information 
There was a level of difficulty to search for some related Internet banking security information on the websites 
of some of the selected banks. For example, in order to find out a password requirement from the AMP bank’s 
website, the Internet banking customers have to visit “Terms and Conditions” page only (AMP Bank Limited, 
n.d.) as there was no link in the “Online Security” information section. In addition, using the AMP Bank’s 
frequently asked questions (FAQ) and search engine also do not provide any required information. 
Encryption and digital certificate 
Nine out of 16 selected banks or 56 percent deployed extended validation SSL certificates. According to 
VeriSign Authentication Services (n.d.-b, p. 1), extended validation SSL certificate provides “high-security 
Internet browsers information to clearly identify a Web site organisational identity”. Furthermore, six out of 
the16 selected banks or 37.5 percent use SSL certificate with 256-bit encryption whereas the other two banks 
use 168-bits and the remaining eight use 128 bit-encryptions. Upgrading to extended validation SSL certificate 
and 256-bit encryption can provide maximum security for bank site authentication as well as increase the 
potential new Internet banking customers’ security confidentiality. In addition, in terms of CA, all of the 
selected banks have signed with a trustworthy public commercial VeriSign Authentication Services. Section 4 in 
Table 2 presents more details on encryption and digital certificates. 
IT hotline/helpdesk support 
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Eight out of the 16 selected banks (50 percent) do not fully provide 24/7 IT helpdesk via telephone support 
regarding Internet banking system issues. However, all of the selected banks, except Macquarie Bank Limited 
provide online, FAQ and secured email supports. For example, the contactable times of NAB Internet banking 
telephone support service are available from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Monday to Friday and 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on 
Saturday and Sunday. Thus, by providing 24/7 IT helpdesk can increase convenience as well as confidentiality 
to banks’ customers. See Section 2.1 in Table 2 for more details. 
Logon user input type 
All selected banks require a keyboard as their primary input type for inserting a user ID, a bank register ID, a 
bank card number or an email address. Only three (Adelaide, Members Equity and Westpac banks) out of these 
16 selected banks use a keypad for a password input type. Out of these three banks, two banks utilise a scramble 
method on their keypad. This means that the keypad is changed every time the webpage is opened. This method 
can reduce the potential risks of the unauthorised keystroke recording. See Sections 5.4 and 5.5 in Table 2 for 
more details. 
Password requirements/restrictions 
No information regarding password restrictions were found in four (Adelaide, Macquarie, Members Equity and 
UBank banks) out of the 16 selected banks. Six of the remaining 12 selected banks required a minimum 
password length of six characters while the other six banks required a minimum password length of eight 
characters. In terms of best practices, the banks that required a minimum password length of six characters may 
be considered less secure as compared to eight characters. Particularly, Westpac Banking Corporation required 
only a six character password length. Furthermore, there were only two banks CBA and Queensland out of the 
16 selected banks (12.5 percent) that allow their customers to use special characters as optional to be included 
into the customer password. This provides a stronger password as compared to using only combinations of just 
numbers, letters, lower and upper cases. In addition, there were only three out of the 16 selected banks that have 
a mechanism for automatically checking password strength when its customer creates or changes his or her 
password. This mechanism can assist banks’ customers in order to create strong password. See Section 5.6 in 
Table 2 for more information.  
Session management 
AMP and Bendigo banks out of 16 selected banks are the only two banks that provide session management 
security information on their websites. For example AMP bank provides session tokens and page tokens 
whereas Bendigo bank provides session cookie information. By providing session management details this will 
enhance Internet banking security awareness as well as Internet banking usage confidentiality to its customers. 
See Section 6.4 in Table 2 for more information. 
Similarity of Internet banking system 
Based on simple information auditing on the selected banks’ websites, there were similarities of the Internet 
banking systems between the Bendigo Bank and Rural Bank. This may be due to the fact that Rural Bank 
Limited is a subsidiary of Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited (Rural Bank Limited, 2010). Furthermore, 
BankSA and St. George Bank have similar Internet banking systems as they are divisions of Westpac Banking 
Corporation (St.George Bank Limited, n.d.). This explains the similarities in the Internet banking technology. 
This provides benefits in terms of reduced complexity of having to manage and maintain two different Internet 
banking systems. However, there may be a small potential risk to both the banks in case of one of its partner’s 
Internet banking system was compromised which consequently exposes the other bank to infiltration. 
Two-factor authentication 
SMS mobile phone and/or token-generated pin techniques are used for the two-factor authentication system in 
half of the selected banks. These two-factor authentication systems are used for logon and/or transaction 
verification purposes by their Internet banking customers. Furthermore, seven out of these eight selected banks 
have made the two-factor authentication system compulsory for transaction section verification to their Internet 
banking customers. See Section 5.7 in Table 2 for more details. Only three out of the eight selected banks allow 
their Internet banking customers to use the two-factor authentication system for logon purpose as an option. See 
for further details in Section 5.2 in Table 2. 
Websites information not up-to-date 
There was no up-to-date Internet banking information found on some of the selected banks’ websites. For 
example, incorrect information on SSL encryption technology, as well as four banks (ANZ, CBA, NAB and 
Bendigo) not providing up-to-date information. Three out of these four banks were from the major four banks 
group. These four banks provided information on their website which indicated that they were using SSL 128-
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bit encryption. However, based on the auditing results these SSL encryption at all four banks were 256-bit. See 
more details on Section 4.1 in Table 2. These results can provide wrong indication to the Internet banking 
customers and can consequently influence the confidence and decision of the potential Internet banking 
customers to enlist as customers. 
CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
The results of the proposed Internet banking security checklist uncovered several interesting issues. All of the 
Australian banks have generally provided a standard Internet banking security system with some optional 
security services to their Internet banking customers. However, these selected banks should enforce a mandatory 
two-factor authentication system for a logon as well as for transaction verification (Ekberg et al., 2007; Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 2004; Georg et al., 2009; Hines, 2006; MidSouth Bank, n.d.; Reavley, 
2005; RSA, 2010).  
Furthermore, a good and effective security policy employed by the banks and legislation instituted by local or 
state governments should be in use and enforced in order to improve security in Internet banking systems 
(Georg et al., 2009; Karim et al., 2009; Victoria Teachers Credit Union, n.d.). Two-factor/multi-factor 
authentication systems, transaction verification, 256-bit encryption with extended validation SSL certificate, 
auto logout feature, suspicious activity monitoring, last login time display, account lockout and audit trails are 
some of examples of a good and effective security policy that could be legislated for.  
Additionally, the banks should provide better authentication and/or transaction processes/mechanisms as new 
and improved technological security measures such as Internet fraud protection (Ekberg et al., 2007; Grimes, 
2006; Karim et al., 2009).  
Moreover, the banks can coordinate with the local and state government agencies such as Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) to build up the confidentiality for online payment systems and enhance performance and better 
Internet banking security services such as personal information theft protection, personal financial information 
theft protection, identity fraud protection and online crime protection (RSA, 2010). 
The banks who currently employ a 128-bit encryption SSL should consider upgrading to a 256-bit encryption 
method. Furthermore, upgrading from standard validation to extended validation SSL certificate should also be 
considered. These two upgrades can provide better confidentiality to both existing and potential Internet banking 
customers (VeriSign Authentication Services, n.d.-b).  
In addition, the banks must be vigilant of new threats/risks such as phishing via SMS/text message 
(“SMiShing”), phishing over the phone (“Vishing”), SSL–evading Trojans (Ekberg et al., 2007; RSA, 2010). 
Furthermore, the banks should be cognisant of customers’ demands, opinions, concerns, mistrusts and/or 
expectations such as their transaction activities monitoring, online and mobile threats concerns and strong 
security methods for online activities, by conducting a survey and offering rewards for customer feedback 
(Ekberg et al., 2007; Georg et al., 2009; RSA, 2010). The feedback from these surveys may be used to build up 
the confidentiality of both existing and potential Internet banking customers. The banks must also properly 
educate and encourage their Internet banking customers to gain awareness on Internet banking security 
threats/risks (Bishop, 2005; Georg et al., 2009; RSA, 2010). The banks should also offer a useful link to 
download and or update antivirus and Internet security software and firewall protections as well (Hines, 2006).   
In the future, the banks may consider deploying biological authentication through biological detection tools to 
protect their Internet banking systems against the attackers such as finger and hand geometry, retinal scan, iris 
scan, fingerprint recognition, face recognition, voice recognition, keystroke recognition, handwriting recognition 
(Bishop, 2005; NewScientist, 2006). Alternatively, the banks may also offer insurance for losses compensation 
due to any potential Internet banking security threats/risks which may occur by inexperienced Internet banking 
customers or lack of their knowledge and/or awareness (Georg et al., 2009). 
Finally, the usefulness of this paper can be enhanced by conducting an in-depth Internet banking customer 
interview and audit particularly on the design and structure of the Internet banking website and mobile banking 
security. These interview and audit can provide benefits to both existing and potential Internet banking 
customers.  
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